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Globalization and the United States Constitution:
How Much Can It Accommodate?
JAMES M. BOYERS'
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization "denotes a process of denationalization of clusters of
political, economic and social activities."' No longer may a country govern
itself efficiently without considering its impact on the global community or the
global community's impact on it. "[A]ll nation-states, including the United
States..., are more vulnerable to actions and decisions rendered outside their
respective borders than ever before."' The search for the best means of
developing national, regional, and world economies has led to supra-national
organization on a regional scale. The European Union (E.U.) provides the most
integrated and long-standing example of this phenomenon. Within it, Member
States have submitted themselves to a different and higherjurisdiction of law
that directly affects their sovereignty.' By binding together economically, and
now politically, on a regional level and establishing a program of integration,
the countries of the E.U. aim to bring greater economic strength to themselves
than they could have attained as individual states.' The pursuit of the common
European good has resulted in confrontations with the constitutions of some
E.U. Member States. In this discussion, Germany will serve as the prime
example of these confrontations because its federal governmental structure is
similar to that of the United States.
* J.D., 1998, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., 1994, Hanover College. The
author would like to thank his parents, John and Mary, his classmates and professors in the Globalization
Seminar, Shelly Gibson, Aron Mefford, and Gaya Abey for their support and assistance.
1. Jost Delbrkck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A
European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
2. Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism: US. and Canadian Perspectives Challenges to
Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN. - U.S. L.J. 303, 303 (1994).
3. See PAUL CRAIG& GRAiNNE DE BURCA, E.C. LAW 241 (1995) [hereinafter E.C. LAW]. Theauthors
quote the European Court of Justice in an early case: "[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals." Case 26/62 N.V.
Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (1963) [hereinafter Van Genden Loos].
4. See Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986,11986] O.J. (L169), 25 I.L.M. 503,507, in E.C. LAW, supra
note 3.
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The United States, Canada, and Mexico have jointly created a Free Trade
Area to benefit their economic interests. By entering the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States agreed to follow non-
discriminatory trade policies regarding the other parties to the agreement,
subject to the review of a binational arbitration panel.' Unlike the European
Community, NAFTA fails to provide permanent supra-national governing
institutions to ensure its proper implementation.6 Despite its limited scope and
institutional framework, NAFTA has definite constitutional implications within
the United States.
This paper first explores the development of the E.U. and how Germany has
dealt with the conflict between its constitutional system and its membership in
the E.U. Second, it distinguishes the purposes of NAFTA from those of the
E.U. Third, it considers possible conflicts between NAFTA's dispute resolution
mechanism and the U.S. Constitution. It concludes by discussing what
possibilities for further supra-national integration the Constitution provides.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON ITS
MEMBER STATES
"After the destruction and ruin of the war years, and the climate of
nationalism which preceded them, many people hoped for a new model of
political co-operation in Europe."7 By establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (E.C.S.C.) in 1951, a few European countries began the slow
process of European integration! In 1957 those countries created the European
Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), further integrating their economies.' The original E.E.C. members
were laterjoined by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark (1973), Greece
5. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993),
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6. See id. at 693. In additional contrast to the E.C., NAFTA fails to provide private rights of action
against any of the Parties to NAFTA based on the agreement's provisions except as discussed in Straight, infra
note 40.
7. E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Id. at 4. France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy were the countries
involved in this integration.
9. Id. at 9-10. This foundation included sharing the European Court of Justice and the Parliamentary
Assembly to implement the purposes ofthe E.E.C. A Council of Ministers and a Commission, though initially
separate, were merged and shared by the Communities in 1965. Id at 10.
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(1981), Spain and Portugal (1986),Io and Austria, Finland, and Sweden
(1995)." The Single European Act (1986)2 and the Maastrict Treaty (1992) 3
further developed the role of the E.U. with these Member States.
A. Decisions by the European Court of Justice
Following Van Gend en Loos, the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.)
continued to expand the influence of E.U. law. The next step came in 1964
when the E.C.J. held that Member States were bound to apply the laws of the
E.U. as their own.' The E.C.J.'s decision relied not on the text of the Treaty
itself, but on the practical necessity of the supremacy of Community law to
fulfill the Treaty's purpose of integration. 5 Building upon these precedents, in
1970, the E.C.J. continued to expand the influence of Community law to the
point of asserting its supremacy over constitutional guarantees of its Member
10. Id. at 14.
11. See G. Porter Elliot, Neutrality, the Acquis Communautaire, and the European Union's Search for
a Common Foreign and Security Policy Under Title Vof the Maastricht Treaty: The Accession ofAustria,
Finland and Sweden, 25 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 601,603 (1996).
12. See Single European Act, supra note 4. This agreement
gave a formal legal basis to European political co-operation. . ., formally recognized
the European Council, amended the existing treaties..., set out the internal market aim
... , [introduced] qualified majority voting by the Council ... into a range of areas
which had previously provided for unanimity..., and added to the existing substantive
areas of Community competence (co-operation in economic and monetary union, social
policy, economic and social cohesion, research and technological development, and
environmental policy).
E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 20-22.
13. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992), 31
I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Maastrict]. The provisions of this treaty include: setting economic goals,
creating a timetable for legal steps to establish effective functioning of the common market, establishing that
nationals of Member States are nationals of the Union with the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections
for European Parliament and municipal elections, and setting goals for future agreements (common foreign and
security policy, harmonizing elements of justice and home affairs, and eventually implementing a single
currency for all Member States).
14. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. End, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 593 (1964). Paul
Craig and Grainne De Burca's discussion ofthe court's arguments justify its holding. "[Tihe treaty created its
own legal order which immediately became 'an integral part' of the legal systems of the Member States....
Member States created this legal order: i.e. by conferring on the new Community institutions 'real powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the Community.' [T]he
spirit and the aims ofthe Treaty [made it]... 'impossible' for the Member States to accord primacy to domestic
laws." E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 244.
15. E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 245.
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States.'6 In Amministazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal Spa 7, the
E.Q J. established that "all national courts are obliged to enforce directly and
immediately a clear and unconditional provision of Community law even where
there is a directly conflicting national law ... [even] one which had no
jurisdiction in the domestic legal system to question or to set aside national
legislative acts." 8 Despite these expansive holdings, "the constitutional orders
of some of the Member States do not easily accommodate the principle of
supremacy."' 9
B. The Reaction of the German Constitutional Court to Supra-National
Advancements
The German Constitution makes possible the delegation of some legislative
power to international organizations.'0 In 1972 the German Administrative
Court stated:
The integration powers contained in Article 24 enable the
Federal legislature to alienate its legislative monopoly in
certain spheres in favor of international institutions. The
Community organs have thereby obtained the power to enact
law directly effective within the territorial scope of the
Constitution without a separate writ of enforcement.... [T]he
Federal legislature could not, when ratifying the EEC Treaty,
disclaim the observance of elementary basic rights in the
Constitution. '
This holding reserved ultimate review of Community law to Germany's court
system. In 1974, the German Constitutional Court, reviewing the case quoted
16. See Case 1i/70, Intemationale HandelsgesellschaftmbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreid und
Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255 (1972), translated in E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 246.
"[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effectwithin a Member State cannot be affected by allegations
that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles
of a national constitutional structure." Id.
17. Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629,[1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978), translated in E.C. LAW, supra note
3, at 247.
18. E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 248.
19. Id. at 250.
20. Id. at 256.
21. Intemationale Handelsgesellschafiv. Einfuhr, [1972] C.M.L.R. 177 (1972), translated in E.C. LAW,
supra note 3, at 257.
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above, supported the earlier ruling by holding: "In this conflict of norms, the
guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution prevails as long as the
competent organs of the Community have not removed the conflict of norms in
accordance with the Treaty mechanisms."I The Constitutional Court failed to
recognize the supremacy ofthe Community law over the German Constitution.
This failure placed the legitimacy ofE.U. law on a somewhat shaky foundation.
By 1986, however, the Constitutional Court had moved away from its
earlier position. Because the Community law and protections are essentially the
same as those provided for by the German Constitution, the Court held that so
long as the European Communities and the E.C.J. provided for the protection
of fundamental rights against the actions ofthe E.C., it would no longer review
E.U. legislation.23 This compromise recognized both the E.U.'s need for
unquestioned legitimacy of its law and the German Constitutional need for
protection of fundamental rights.
When the Maastrict Treaty was signed in 1992, this led Germany to amend
its Constitution. "[T]he newly amended Article 23 specifically authorize[d] the
Federation to transfer sovereign rights to the European Union. [However], a
possible violation ofthe German Constitution was still an issue because Article
79(3), in conjunction with Article 20 declares any constitutional amendment
that infringes on the democratic principle inadmissible."' The Constitutional
Court found that the provisions of Maastrict did not violate this democratic
legitimacy."'
Later in the opinion, the Constitutional Court established the limits to the
E.U.'s legitimate activities established by the German Constitution. The E.U.
cannot enact laws that directly apply to Germany unless those laws fall within
areas specifically established by existing agreements. Otherwise "it would be
possible for the European Communities to exercise functions and powers which
22. 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 549-50 (1974) (F.R.G), translated in EC. LAw, supra note 3, at 258-59.
23. Re Wunshe Handelsgesellschaft [B VerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225,
265 (1986) translated in E.C. LAw, supra note 3, at 260.
24. Manfred H. Wiegandt, Recent Developments: Germany's International Integration: The Rulings
of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Maastricht Treaty and the Out-of-Area Deployment of
German Troops, 10 AM. U.J. I-r'L L. & POL'Y 889, 891 (1995).
25. Brunner v. European Union Treaty[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57
(F.R.G.), translated in 33 I.L.M. 388, 417 (1994).
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are not mentioned."26 This effectively prevents the E.U. from overstepping its
enumerated powers. "[T]he Constitutional Court in Brunner has made clear
that it ivill continue to review the actions of European 'institutions and
agencies'-which presumably includes the Court [E.C.J.]-to ensure that they
remain within the proper limits of their acquired powers."27
The move toward European integration and supra-national governance has
created a tension between the Member States and the E.U. While Germany has
amended its Constitution to accommodate greater integration and has
recognized the supremacy of Community law within specified areas, its
Constitutional Court has reserved for itselfthe right to determine when the E.U.
goes beyond the scope of its enumerated powers. This does not amount to
unconditional acceptance of the supra-national power of the E.U. The German
Constitutional Court serves as a check on the E.U.'s ability to expand its area
of power. "[T]here are fundamental limits on the process imposed by desires
for local autonomy over certain issues."2"
III. DISTINGUISHING NAFTA FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
A study ofNAFTA and the E.U. conjures up the proverbial comparison of
"apples to oranges." The E.U. "has assumed functions in a wide array of areas
hitherto considered typical State prerogatives...." 29 For example, the E.U. has
observer status in the U.N. General Assembly,3" hasgoverning institutions,3 and
perhaps most strikingly, has created E.U. citizenship.32 NAFTA has nothing
comparable. In fact, NAFTA has a relatively loose structure to achieve its
purposes. It aims to reduce and eventually eliminate tariff and non-tariff
26. Id. at 422.
27. E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 263. This decision made clear that goals mentioned in the Maastrict
Treaty, such as cooperation in security, justice, and home affairs, could not be governed by the E.C. without
further separate agreements by the Member States. Wiegandt, supra note 24, at 894.
28. William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on its Limits and Effects, I IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 185, 203 (1993).
29. Christoph Scheuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigmfor International
Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 447,451 (1993). "These include regulation of external trade, economic policy, anti-
trust regulation, social policy, regional policy and environmental protection to name just a few." Id.
30. Id. at 462.
31. E.C. LAW, supra note 3, at 10.
32. Scheuer, supra note 29, at 469. "The creation of a 'citizenship of the Union' as provided in the
Maastricht Treaty gives legal expression to broader political identifications going beyond the State of the
individual's nationality." Id.
[Vol. 5:583
1998] GLOBALIZATION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 589
barriers within the North American region.3 NAFTA "grants national
treatment not only for imported goods ... but also for investments and services
as diverse as banking, brokerage, insurance, law, and transportation. '34
NAFTA does not mention any regional governing institutions with supra-
national powers." Because "each member nation acquires a stake in the
region's economic and environmental progress ... NAFTA does not require a
supra-national court of compulsory jurisdiction and coercive sanctions to
enforce fairness of treatment; the most effective sanction is the loss of a
market. 3
6
NAFTA utilizes a system of binational arbitral panels to resolve disputes
between parties to the agreement. Chapter 19 of NAFTA sets up a system of
binational panel review for the resolution of disputes between Parties regarding
anti-dumping and countervailing duties." Chapter 20 applies "to the avoidance
or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regarding the interpretation or
application of this Agreement or wherever a Party considers that an actual or
proposed measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with the
obligations of this Agreement ....
Article 2001 of Chapter 20 establishes a Free Trade Commission comprised
of cabinet level representatives of each government to supervise the
implementation ofNAFTA, oversee its further elaboration, resolve disputes that
may arise regarding its interpretation or application, establish rules and
procedures for the resolution of such disputes, and oversee a Secretariat charged
with providing administrative assistance to such entities as the Commission
shall create.39 Parties to a dispute "must use consultations and arbitration prior
to a request for NAFTA panel proceedings. '4 Should these activities fail to
resolve the dispute, the next step involves establishing a panel.
These panels are selected from rosters of up to thirty individuals from each
country who "have expertise in law, international trade, ... or the resolution of
33. Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA in the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARiz. J. INT'L& COMP. L.
135, 138 (1996).
34. Id.
35. Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and
the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. CoMp. L. 917,918 (1992).
36. Kozolchyk, supra note 33, at 139.
37. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 682-93.
38. Id at 694.
39. Id at 693.
40. Samuel C. Straight, GA TTandNAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty
of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216, 224 (1995).
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disputes arising under international trade agreements" and who are chosen on
the "basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment." 41 First, the Parties
must agree upon a chairman of the panel, then select two panelists who are
citizens of the other Party.42 Once the panel is selected, the Parties shall be
entitled to "initial and rebuttal written submissions" as well as "at least one
hearing before the panel. ' 43 From this point, Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 differ
as to result and procedure.
A. Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 19
Chapter 19 deals with the narrow area of anti-dumping law and
countervailing duties. In contrast to Chapter 20, "private parties are guaranteed
the same right that they possess under domestic law to challenge agency
determinations." 44 When reviewing determinations of administrative agencies
the panels that determine Chapter 19 disputes shall use the same standard of
review that the courts of the challenged party would apply.4 These Chapter 19
panel decisions, unlike Chapter 20 determinations, will be binding on the Parties
"with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before the
panel."'
These decisions may be appealed to a special extraordinary challenge
committee composed of three members "selected from a 15-person roster
comprised of judges or former judges" from each Party's equivalent of the
federal level in the United States. 47 A panel decision may only be reviewed on
the following grounds: panel members materially violated the rules of conduct,
the panel seriously departed from its rules of procedure, or the panel exceeded
41. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 695.
42. Id. at 696.
43. Id.
44. Straight, supra note 40, at232. "An involved Party on its own initiative may request review ofa final
determination by a panel and shall, on request of a person who would otherwise be entitled under the law ofthe
importing Party to commence domestic procedures forjudicial review of the final determination, request such
review." NAFTA, supra note 5, at 683.
45. Straight, supra note 40, at 233.
46. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 683.
47. Id. at 688.
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its powers, authority, or jurisdiction." Once a panel decision has been
requested, a Party may not subject the controversy to concurrentjudicial review
in its domestic courts and a Party may not request that its legislature provide for
judicial review from a panel decision.49 This element of dispute resolution
between the Parties holds the greatest evidence of a loss of sovereignty by the
Parties. In contrast, NAFTA has created controlling jurisdiction in only one
very limited area. This reflects the vast differences in purpose and institutions
between NAFTA and the E.C.
B. Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution
Panel decisions under Chapter 20 reflect the hesitation on the part of the
Parties to relinquish final control over their own state activities. One author
argues that NAFTA has a weak dispute resolution system because contentious
dispute resolutions might "undermine the political stability of the new regional
arrangement" and that NAFTA likely would not have been approved had it
created a system that would interfere with sovereign national institutions.
In effect, the United States and Mexico decided not to be bound by the decisions
of the binational panels under Chapter 20. "Canada agreed that Canadian
courts can enforce the decisions [of the panel] . . . [w]hereas the U.S. and
Mexico say 'no, we will decide whether we accept it or not, and if we do not,
we are willing to pay for it..'.' Article 2019 of Chapter 20 establishes that the
complaining or winning party may, if the losing party refuses to honor that
decision, suspend equivalent benefits to the losing party.52 This puts the
decision in the hands of the state, which must measure its ultimate decision
according to its sovereign needs.
IV. NAFTA's CHALLENGES TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
NAFTA fails to institutionalize bodies with binding supra-national powers
except in a limited area. However, by joining the agreement, the United States
has created conflicts with its own Constitution. One can argue that NAFTA
48. Jd. at 683.
49. Jd.
50. Abbot, supra note 35, at 944-45.
51. Gary N. Horlick, Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation, 20 CAN. - U.S. L.J. 57, 60-61
(1994).
52. NAFTA, supra note 5, at 697.
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offends Article III," violates Article II treaty requirements,54 and affects the
sovereignty of the fifty states.5 This section shall evaluate each of these
arguments.
A. The Article IArgument
"NAFTA removes certain cases from thejurisdiction of federal courts and
places those cases within a new dispute resolution mechanism .... It envisions
a significant role for federal judges as panel and challenge committee
members." 6 Article III places "the judicial power of the United States... in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may . ..
establish."" Article III gives federal judges life tenure, prevents their salary
from being reduced, and limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies."
These provisions were created to ensure an independentjudiciary and guarantee
citizens an impartial hearing of their cause.59 We must consider if the NAFTA
dispute resolution system invades the realm of the Article III courts or threatens
Article III's purposes.
In limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has found certain Article I
courts unconstitutional.'
[T]he key issue in an Article III case is whether a given forum
is exercising "the judicial Power of the United States," and
therefore must possess the attributes of life tenure, non-
diminishable compensation, and case-and-controversy
53. See Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141 (1994).
54. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1272-78 (1995) (discussing the Treaty Clause
requirement of two-thirds Senate approval for all treaties and the post-World War II use of congressional-
executive international agreements).
55. See Julie Long, Ratcheting Up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 M NN. L. REV. 231 (1995).
56. Metropoulos, supra note 53, at 149.
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
58.Id.
59. Metropoulos, supra note 53, at 149-50.
60. Id. at 151. These "include courts in the District of Columbia, the U.S. Tax Court, [Bankruptcy Court]
and military courts-martial." Id.
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adjudication, or whether that forum is merely carrying out
congressional powers under Article .'1
However, the Supreme Court has also held that Article I bankruptcy courts
cannot hear common law claims that arise in bankruptcy proceedings. 2 In
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,63 the Supreme Court
established a balancing test to determine when Article III is violated. In
addition, the Court held that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission did
not violate Article III by adjudicating state law counter-claims because the right
to Article III adjudication had been waived by the respondents.
Demetrios Metropoulos argues that a recent decision by the E.C.J. striking
down a similar dispute resolution system between the E.C. and the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) indicates how the U.S. courts will react.' In In Re
Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 5 the E.C.J. held the dispute
resolution system invalid on three grounds: the substantial overlap in subject
matter jurisdiction between the existing court system and the proposed new
court would create confusion, the E.C.J. did not agree with having its own
judges "serve two masters"; and the E.C.J. objected to granting advisory
opinions to EFTA courts because it would change the nature of the E.C.J.'
These threats to the E.C.J. justified rejecting the proposed dispute resolution
system.
61. Id. "Congress, acting foi a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article
I, may create a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated with a public regulatory scheme as to be
a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 840 (1986). See Metropoulos, supra note 53, at 162.
62. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (4-justice
plurality).
63. Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n, 478 U.S. 833. In determining whether a non-Article III
tribunal has encroached upon Article Ill guarantees the Supreme Court considers several things, none of which
by itself leads to the determination. "Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent to which
the 'essential attributes ofjudicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III." Id. at 851.
64. See Metropoulos, supra note 53.
65. Case 1/91, 1 C.M.L.R. 245 (1992).
66. Metropoulos, supra note 53, at 158-59. Metropoulos gives a factual background of the European
Economic Area (EEA) Treaty between the E.C. and EFTA which discusses the make up of the proposed EEA
Court (five of eight judges from the E.C.J.) and the role of the E.C.J. in granting advisory opinions to EFTA
Member States. Id. at 156.
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The operation oftwo different entities on the same laws,judges serving two
masters, and the granting of advisory opinions would arise under the NAFTA
framework as well.
"[S]pillover" ofjurisprudence is ... possible..., as Article III
courts continue to adjudicate claims against non-NAFTA
exporters (and those NAFTA exporters who do not elect panel
review) while non-Article III panels assess similar claims
under NAFTA... Article III judges will serve as panelists.
.. [and] Article IIIjudges... will be issuing advisory opinions
on statutory amendments.67
In other words, utilizing Article IIIjudges for non-Article III activities creates
a definite constitutional problem. This problem may justify a holding against
the binational panel system of NAFTA.
Applying the Commodity Futures Trading Commission test may prove to
be a more accurate assessment of how the Supreme Court would resolve this
issue. The first element, intrusion on Article III power, can be found in the
exercise of traditional Article III powers (entertaining motions, reviewing briefs,
hearing oral arguments, and writing opinions that are binding without a federal
court order) and traditional Article III jurisdiction (including anti-dumping,
subsidy, and trade disputes).6 The second element, "the nature and importance
of individual rights transferred," comes out in favor of NAFTA because the
binational panels will deal with public rights." The third element, the
congressional interest in departing from Article III courts, does not effectively
reduce court backlog or create courts in highly specialized areas, two previously
accepted reasons for departing from Article III courts. ° Article III could
amount to a large stumbling block should there be a constitutional challenge to
NAFTA's dispute resolution system.
67. Id. at 160-61.
68. Id. at 162-63.
69. Id. at 163.
70. Id. at 166-67. The Metropoulos argues that the U.S. Court of International Trade already deals with
these problems. Id. at 167.
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B. Article II: A Treaty or Not a Treaty
A treaty is a "compact made between two or more independent nations with
a view to the public welfare."'" NAFTA fits this definition. The United States
Constitution establishes the power ofthe President with regard to treaties: "He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.... "' President
Clinton submitted NAFTA to both the House and Senate for pure majority
approval of both bodies according to a procedure called "congressional-
executive agreement."" The Senate approved NAFTA with only sixty-one
Senators voting for ratification and thirty-eight against.74 This bicameral treaty
ratification explicitly fails to satisfy the textual requirements of the
Constitution. However, this issue never arose during the Congressional
discussion on ratification.
Recently, the debate on the applicability of the Treaty Clause to
international agreements such as NAFTA and WTO surfaced in two articles in
the Harvard Law Review.7" Bruce Ackerman and David Golove argue that
because the Senate acquiesced to a series of "congressional-executive"
agreements in 1945 and 1946, in the face of a possible constitutional
amendment to legitimize the "congressional-executive" agreement, this new
agreement gained constitutional legitimacy.7' In addition, they conclude that the
Necessary and Proper Clause justified the Senate's abdication of authority."
In response to this argument, Lawrence Tribe asserts that when the Senate
allowed the House to participate in approving international agreements it did not
change what the Constitution requires, but showed "an apparent willingness to
circumvent what national leaders still widely saw as its [the Constitution's]
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990).
72. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §2, cl. 2 [hereinafter Treaty Clause].
73. Tribe, supra note 54, at 1223. Laurence Tribe's article debates an article advocating that NAFTA's
ratification was constitutional. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1995).
74. 139 CONG. REc. S16, 712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
75. See Tribe, supra note 54; Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73.
76. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 73, at 874.
77. Id. at 913. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, "Let the end be legitimate.
and all means which are appropriate.. which are not prohibited... are constitutional," the authors utilize
an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify their Constitutional understanding in the
contextofNAFTA. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)). They maintain
that because Article I establishes Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce, the end purpose of NAFTA
is legitimate, appropriate, and constitutional. Id at 914.
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unambiguous command.""8 Ackerman and Golove use pragmatic concerns and
political decisions to justify what appears, on its face, to be a direct conflict
with the text of the Treaty Clause. The debate shall continue until the Supreme
Court makes a ruling based on the use of"congressional-executive" agreements
in international affairs.79 NAFTA may not create the controversy necessary to
lead to a reevaluation of recent treaty modifications. However, any future
treaties having greater effects on U.S. sovereignty would likely provoke
Congressional debate on this issue.
C. Encroachment on States' Sovereignty?
Based upon the Supremacy Clause and Congress' power to regulate foreign
commerce, the federal government has the authority to make laws regarding
foreign commerce that limit the actions of the individual state and local
governments." However, areas such as taxation have traditionally been left to
the states to control. Powers historically reserved to the states will not be
overrun by federal regulations unless those regulations express a "clear and
manifest purpose" to do so.8" NAFTA and its implementing legislation likely
satisfy the requirement of a "clear and manifest purpose" to supersede some
state laws. The U.S. courts will explore the extent to which NAFTA might
require change of state laws.8"
Barclays Bank P.L.C. v. Franchise Tax Board of California"3 provides an
example of the Supreme Court limiting the federal influence on the California
tax system. The Court found that California's tax system did not violate the
78. Tribe, supra note 54, at 1301 (emphasis added).
79. The Supreme Court recently discussed the issue of the expansion of Congressional powers. "The
constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the 'consent' of the governmental unit whose
domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States." New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144,182 (1992). This line of reasoning could be used to exclude the Senate's "consent" in the
context of the "congressional-executive" agreement.
80. Fry, supra note 2, at 315. This includes taxation, regulation, export assistance, and investment
incentive packages. These could all be considered "trade-distorting practices" that might be subject to federal
preemption based on NAFTA. Id.
81. Rice v. Santa Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
82. "[C]ourts faced with a challenge involving a level of authority outside the federalist system must ask
whether the benefit of passing that discretion to the supranational body is worth the cost to federalism as a
whole." Long, supra note 55, at 262.
83. Barclays Bank P.L.C. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). For a discussion
of this case in the same context, see Long, supra note 55, at 239-42.
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Commerce Clause." While emphasizing that state power is more limited in the
realm of foreign commerce, the Court found insufficient evidence that the tax
system "impose[d] inordinate compliance burdens on foreign enterprises.""5
In its holding, the Court found that California did not prevent the United States
from speaking with one voice in foreign commerce. 6 This case demonstrates
the Court's desire to preserve traditional state sovereignty.
NAFTA differs from the situation in Barclays for one important reason:
NAFTA does not provide for private remedies when individual states violate its
provisions. NAFTA states that "state law cannot be declared invalid because
it is inconsistent with NAFTA, except in an action brought by the United States
to declare the state law invalid."" In other words, NAFTA does not have direct
effect upon the individual states. NAFTA actually provides for consultations
between the federal government and the governments of the states in order to
bring state law into accordance with NAFTA requirements."8 Only the federal
government will be held responsible when states fail to comply with NAFTA
norms.
8 9
In developing NAFTA, the United States went to great pains to avoid
creating a supra-national entity that would create laws with direct effect upon
the states. However, this process will create definite changes. "[S]overeignty
and federalism will evolve rather substantially before NAFTA is fully
implemented in 2008."9o Instead of being an international agreement with direct
effect on the states, NAFTA will push the federal government into more areas
traditionally reserved to the states. Some hope that the seeds planted by
NAFTA will lead to the creation of supra-national institutions capable of
84. The complaining party must demonstrate "that the tax (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial
nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is
not fairly related to the services provided by the State." Barclays Bank P.L.C., 512 U.S. at 310-11.
85. Id. at 314.
86. Id. at 327-28. In its analysis, the Court supported its conclusion by stating "Congress has long
debated, but has not enacted, legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income." Id. at 322.
87. Straight, supra note 40, at 249.
88. The President consults with the states through policy advisory committees to ensure their conformity,
and the U.S. Trade Representative consults with the states about issues that will impact them. Id. at 250. Only
if these means fail will the federal government take action to challenge the state or local law. Id.
89. Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment (Sept. 7, 1993), reprinted in 93 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2858, 2862
(responding to concerns that section 105 ofNAFTA would require preemption of state laws), in Straight, supra
note 40, at 252 nn.192, 214.
90. Fry, supra note 2, at 317.
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harmonizing the laws of the three countries.9' For those seeds to grow to that
extent, a constitutional amendment will need to be ratified.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of the E.C. has not been a smooth transition. Although
its members stand committed to the concept of integrating at a certain level, this
level may not be the same for all of them. Integrating into a supra-national
framework creates fundamental problems of legitimacy. Even after a
constitutional amendment to open Germany up to greater involvement within the
E.U., the German Constitutional Court reserved for itself the right to check the
ability of the E.U. to go beyond its specifically enumerated powers. Other
Member States have reserved similar powers.' This reflects a lack of the unity
necessary to make supra-national governmental bodies strong enough to
withstand a truly divisive crisis.
NAFTA developed in a much different environment than the E.U.
Unlike the E.U. members, the parties to NAFTA never faced the continental
destruction of a massive armed conflict. The United States stands as the
only super-power in the world. None of the European countries have equal
independent power. This lack of independent strength created a great
incentive for Europeans to bind together to become more competitive on a
global scale. In order to insure this cooperation between former enemies,
they created a supra-national entity with binding powers. The United States
has different and less compelling motivations for seeking the economic
cooperation of its neighbors. NAFTA only enhances the United States'
dominant role in international trade.
The U.S. Constitution serves as the foundation and source of legitimacy
for our government. As globalizing forces require our country to face new
challenges, the Constitution will limit the means of meeting these challenges.
If NAFTA, which has modest aims in comparison to the E.U., creates
legitimate constitutional conflicts, integrating on a greater scale into any
supra-national framework will not be feasible without a Constitutional
Amendment.
At this time, the United States lacks the incentive to pursue greater
integration. If globalizing forces change our incentives in the future, the
91. Abbott, supra note 35, at 948.
92. See generally E.C. LAW, supra note 3 (discussing Italy, France and the United Kingdom).
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following Amendment should replace the beginning of Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2:
The President shall have the power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
to make Treaties, to join economic and trade agreements that
establish international dispute resolution bodies of special
and limited jurisdiction, and to appoint members of such
dispute resolution bodies, provided three-fifths of those
Representatives and Senators present concur.
This Amendment would provide protection of individual state sovereignty
while including a popular support element, protect our nation from
delegating its sovereignty on the narrowest of Congressional majorities, and
fail to foreclose the possibility of Article III review of any dispute resolution
body decisions. Such an amendment could serve as a helpful change to
satisfy those afraid of losing too much sovereignty. It would create a greater
sense of constitutional legitimacy in our international activities.

